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1. Introduction
Considerable attention has been given to examin-
ing the association between corporate disclosure
and share price anticipation of earnings (e.g.
Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Lundholm and
Myers, 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Hussainey
et al., 2003 and Schleicher et al., 2007). These pa-
pers find that the stock market’s ability to antici-
pate future earnings changes is significantly
improved when firms voluntarily provide higher
levels of disclosure. However, these studies do not
take into account the possibility that dividend pol-
icy may provide an alternative device for convey-
ing value-relevant information to the stock market
that might act as a substitute or complement for
narrative disclosure in the financial communica-
tion process.
Hanlon et al. (2007) examine the impact of div-
idend propensity (i.e. whether a firm pays cash
dividends) on the stock market’s ability to antici-
pate future earnings. They modify and use the re-
turns-earnings regression model introduced by
Collins et al. (1994) to compare the association be-
tween current-year stock returns and future earn-
ings for firms that pay dividends in the current
year as compared with non-dividend-paying firms.
They find that US dividend-paying firms exhibit
significantly higher levels of share price anticipa-
tion of earnings than non-dividend-paying firms.
In addition, Hanlon et al. (2007) control for dis-
closure quality, as measured by AIMR-FAF scores,
and they find that the significance of the dividend
policy for anticipating future earnings is reduced.
This suggests that dividends and disclosure might
be substitute forms of financial communication.
However, it is possible that the relative informa-
tion content of dividends and voluntary disclosure
could be different in the US than in the UK as the
proportion of UK dividend-paying firms is greater
than US dividend-paying firms in the period of
1996–2002 (73% in the UK compared with 23% in
the US; see Denis and Osobov, 2008 for more de-
tails).1
The present paper examines the joint effects of
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dividend propensity and voluntary disclosure on
share price anticipation of earnings.
In undertaking this task, we argue that it is vital
to take into account the growth characteristics of
firms. There are strong theoretical and empirical
grounds for expecting this to be the case. Several
researchers (see, for example, Brown et al., 1999;
Francis and Schipper, 1999 and Lev, 1989) have
identified a number of problems with the financial
reporting process, instances of accounting ‘fail-
ure’. Particular attention has been paid to the in-
ability of the financial reporting system to capture
the value-relevance of intangible investments on a
timely basis (see, for example, Amir and Lev,
1996; Lev, 2001 and Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).
High growth and intangible asset intensity are fac-
tors that tend to reduce the predictive value of cur-
rent earnings for future earnings. Investors of
high-growth firms are aware that current earnings
provide a poor guide to the future financial per-
formance of the firm. Thus, when valuing these
firms, investors tend to seek other, more timely,
predictors of future earnings beyond current earn-
ings.
In this paper we use the future earnings response
model of Collins et al. (1994) to measure the de-
gree of share price anticipation of earnings. We
test whether the level of share price anticipation of
earnings varies with dividend propensity and with
the level of voluntary disclosure. We also test
whether the associations between dividend
propensity or voluntary disclosure and share price
anticipation of earnings differ between high- and
low-growth firms.
Our results show that both narrative disclosure
level and dividend propensity are associated with
significantly improved share price anticipation of
earnings for high-growth firms. Moreover, for
high-growth firms, narrative disclosure and divi-
dend propensity appear, to some extent, to be sub-
stitute forms of financial communication. In
contrast we find that neither narrative disclosure
level nor dividend propensity exhibit significant
association with share price anticipation of earn-
ings for low-growth firms.
Thus the paper makes an important and novel
contribution to the literature on corporate financial
communication. So far as we are aware, it is the
only paper to examine the joint role of narrative
disclosure and dividend propensity on prices lead-
ing earnings. Moreover, it is the first paper to show
that the predictive value of dividend propensity
and narrative disclosure is sensitive to the growth
characteristics of the firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 re-
views the prior literature and develops our hy-
potheses. In Section 3, we describe the generation
of our disclosures scores. Our measure of share
price anticipation of earnings is discussed in
Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and we
present our main regression results in Section 6.
Section 7 presents our specification check and
Section 8 concludes and suggests areas for future
research.
2. Prior research and hypotheses 
development
2.1. Disclosure and prices leading earnings
There is a growing body of literature which ex-
amines how corporate disclosures affect the stock
market’s ability to anticipate future earnings
changes. Hussainey et al. (2003) examine the in-
formation content of annual report narrative sec-
tions for anticipating future earnings for UK firms.
Their work builds on the earlier work of
Schleicher and Walker (1999) but, by adopting the
augmented returns-earnings regression model of
Collins et al. (1994), uses a research design closer
to those used in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and
Lundholm and Myers (2002).
Hussainey et al. (2003) and Schleicher and
Walker (1999) find that improved levels of annual
report disclosures tend to lead to higher levels of
share price anticipation of earnings. In particular,
Hussainey et al. (2003) find that forward-looking
earnings statements in the annual report narratives
increase the market’s ability to anticipate future
earnings change. However, they do not find signif-
icant results when using a disclosure metric based
on all types of forward-looking statements. Gelb
and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers
(2002) find that the quality of corporate disclosure,
as measured by AIMR-FAF analysts’ rankings of
disclosure, is positively associated with the mar-
ket’s ability to anticipate future earnings changes.
Schleicher et al. (2007) find that the association
between levels of annual report disclosures and
share price anticipation of earnings is not the same
for profitable and unprofitable firms. They find
that the ability of stock returns to anticipate next
period’s earnings change is significantly greater
for unprofitable firms that provide higher levels of
earnings predictions in their annual report narra-
tives. They did not find such results for profitable
firms.
None of the above papers makes any distinction
between high-growth firms and low-growth firms.
However all of these studies make use of the rela-
tionship between current and future earnings and
stock returns to assess the information content of
corporate disclosures. Moreover, it is well known
that differences in growth rates cause the associa-
tion between stock returns and contemporaneous
earnings changes to vary between firms (Collins
and Kothari, 1989 and Rayburn, 1986). High-
growth firms tend to have higher levels of intangi-
ble assets (Thornhill and Gellatly, 2005). Such
38 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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intangible assets tend to reduce the value-rele-
vance of current earnings for overall firm value. If
the benefits from these assets are uncertain, in-
vestors will find it more difficult to appraise firm
value (Kothari et al., 2002). Additionally, Lee et al.
(2005) argue that increasing uncertainty about fu-
ture benefits will lead to more information asym-
metry between investors and managers and may
introduce noise in the estimation of firm value in
high-tech in comparison with low-tech firms.2
Firms can reduce such information asymmetry by
providing additional voluntary information
(Ertimur, 2004). In this paper, we ask whether in-
creasing the level of annual report forward-look-
ing disclosures improves the stock market’s ability
to anticipate future earnings changes, especially
for high-growth firms.
While no papers have examined the effect of
firm-specific growth characteristics on the associ-
ation between disclosure and the stock market’s
ability to anticipate future earnings changes, possi-
bly the most closely related paper to ours is Kwon
(2002). Kwon (2002) compares analysts’ forecast
accuracy and dispersion between high-tech and
low-tech firms. He finds that high-tech firms have
lower error and dispersion of analyst earnings
forecasts than low-tech firms. In addition, he finds
that high-tech firms have higher analyst forecast
accuracy than low-tech firms. He attributes this
finding to differences in the level of voluntary dis-
closure provided by these firms. In particular, he
states that high-tech firms increase their levels of
voluntary disclosure to attract more analysts.
Increasing disclosure leads to higher levels of ana-
lyst forecast accuracy and lower levels of forecast
dispersion. The finding of Kwon’s paper is impor-
tant in relation to ours as it indicates that firm char-
acteristics such as growth prospects can condition
the forecasting practices of stock market partici-
pants.
Considerable attention has been paid to the in-
ability of financial performance measures to cap-
ture the value relevance of intangible investments
on a timely basis (see Abdolmohammadi et al.,
2006; Lee et al, 2005; Lev, 2001; Lev and
Zarowin, 1999). As a consequence, the predictive
value of current earnings for future earnings is
lower for intangibles-rich high-growth firms than
for low-growth firms.
Given the limited usefulness of their current
earnings for predicting future earnings, one possi-
ble response for firms with significant unrecog-
nised intangible assets or high-growth prospects is
to make voluntary disclosure in order to convey
value-relevant information in a more timely way
(Gelb, 2002; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2005 and
Khurana et al., 2006). Moreover, since current
earnings provide a better basis for predicting fu-
ture earnings for low-growth firms, we expect the
influence of disclosure on the relationship between
current returns and future earnings to be stronger
for high-growth firms than low-growth firms.
The following hypotheses focus on how volun-
tary disclosure affects the stock market’s ability to
anticipate future earnings:
H1 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is positively related to the level of
voluntary disclosure.
H2 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is positively related to the level of
voluntary disclosure for high-growth firms.
H3 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is positively related to the level of
voluntary disclosure for low-growth firms.
We also compare the effect of voluntary disclo-
sure between high- and low-growth firms. Thus,
the fourth hypothesis states:
H4 The strength of the degree of association be-
tween share price anticipation of earnings
and voluntary disclosure is greater for high-
growth firms than for low-growth firms.
2.2. Dividends and prices leading earnings
Apart from the audited financial statements, vol-
untary disclosure is one of two main ways that
firms can communicate information about future
earnings to the stock market. The other way is
through some types of financial policy choices.
There is a vast literature that explores the possi-
bility that financial policy choices may serve to
convey information to the market. One such line of
argument focuses on financial signalling as a solu-
tion to the adverse selection problem. In this paper
we focus on one particular form of financial sig-
nalling, cash dividends. There is a substantial
amount of literature on dividend signalling in its
various forms. This literature has produced a com-
plex set of models that can be used to rationalise
alternative types of dividend signalling behaviour,
that can represent different forms of dividend pol-
icy, and that generate different models of the rela-
tionship between company cash flows, dividends,
and share prices (see Allen and Michaely, 2003;
Benartzi et al., 1997; Eades, 1982; and Grullon 
et al., 2003 for surveys).
Another line of argument focuses on financial
policy choices as a part of the solution to in-
vestor/manager agency conflicts. For example,
Jensen (1986) points to the potential agency costs
of firms having very high free cash flows, and the
need to set limits to the discretionary investment
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 39
2 High-tech firms invest more in unrecognised intangible
assets (Kwon, 2002). As a consequence, our high-growth sam-
ple contains a much larger proportion of high-tech firms than
the low-growth sample.
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choices of company managers. Under this line of
reasoning, the payment of dividends is potentially
informative about the quality of external investor
protection in the firm. Note that under this line of
reasoning, the communication of information is in-
cidental to the governance role of dividends.
Some recent studies explore the nature of the in-
formation revealed by dividends (i.e. Grullon et
al., 2002 and Nam et al., 2008). These studies sug-
gest that dividends changes are associated with
changes in firm risk. In particular, Nam et al.
(2008) show that firms that initiate dividend pay-
ment experience a reduction in risk, and Grullon et
al. (2002) show that firms that increase their pay-
out ratios experience reduced risk.
A number of papers have studied the empirical
links between earnings quality (in particular earn-
ings persistence) and dividend payouts. The recent
papers of Garcia-Borbolla et al. (2004) and
Skinner (2004) identify subtle and complex inter-
actions between dividend propensity and the qual-
ity of earnings. Moreover, these studies reveal
significant differences between US and European
firms. Skinner’s study suggests that dividends are
more likely to be paid by the larger, more stable
US firms. Such firms tend to have more pre-
dictable earnings streams. Thus his work suggests
that the predictability of earnings from current
earnings and the payment of dividends are mutual-
ly related through the underlying stability of the
firm. On the other hand, the study by Garcia-
Borbolla et al. (2004) of European firms concludes
that dividends are more useful for predicting future
earnings where the quality of earnings is low.
This paper makes no attempt to identify the spe-
cific types of information that dividend payments
convey to investors. As in Hanlon et al. (2007) we
simply start from the observation that not all firms
pay dividends. Firms that do not pay dividends, by
definition, cannot be using dividends to communi-
cate value-relevant information. On the other
hand, the payment of dividends may change the
ability of the market to anticipate future earnings
changes.
Relative to Hanlon et al. we make three contri-
butions. First we present results for the UK econo-
my for a period in which the propensity to pay
dividends was much higher than in the US. The 
average dividend propensity for the firms in our
sample is 84%, considerably higher than the corre-
sponding propensity for US firms. For example,
Skinner (2008) reports an average dividend
propensity of 28% for US listed firms for the years
1995–2004. Second, we jointly model the effects
of voluntary disclosure and dividend propensity on
share price anticipation of earnings. Third, we
model the extent to which the effects of dividend
propensity and voluntary disclosure on share price
anticipation of earnings are linked to the growth
characteristics of firms.
Hanlon et al. (2007) make no distinction be-
tween high- and low-growth firms. However it can
be argued that the importance of other information
for predicting future earnings could differ between
high- and low-growth situations. High-growth
firms typically exhibit higher levels of information
asymmetry than low-growth firms, and high-
growth firms are more likely to need to raise ex-
ternal capital in order to finance their dividend
payments whilst maintaining high levels of invest-
ments. Thus there are good reasons to expect the
effects of voluntary disclosure and dividend
propensity to vary between high- and low-growth
firms.
Thus we state the following hypotheses:
H5 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is greater for dividend-paying firms
than for non-dividend-paying firms.
H6 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is greater for dividend-paying high-
growth firms than non-dividend-paying high-
growth firms.
H7 The degree of share price anticipation of
earnings is greater for dividend-paying low-
growth firms than non-dividend-paying low-
growth firms.
H8 The strength of the degree of association be-
tween share price anticipation of earnings
and dividend propensity is greater for high-
growth firms than low-growth firms.
2.3. The joint effect of disclosure and dividends
on prices leading earnings
Having introduced the main hypotheses relating
to share price anticipation of earnings and the two
forms of financial communication we now consid-
er how to test whether the two forms of communi-
cation act as complements or substitutes. There are
four logical possibilities:
First, if voluntary disclosure and dividend pay-
ments are different ways of conveying the same in-
formation, then firms that have high levels of
disclosure but pay no dividends, should exhibit
roughly the same degree of share price anticipation
of earnings as firms with high levels of disclosure
that pay dividends. Similarly firms that pay divi-
dends should have roughly the same level of share
price anticipation of earnings irrespective of their
level of disclosure.
Second, if dividend payments and voluntary dis-
closure convey unrelated types of information,
then the level of share price anticipation of earn-
ings for firms that have high levels of disclosure
and pay dividends should be stronger than the
level of share price anticipation of earnings for
firms that have high levels of disclosure but do not
40 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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pay dividends. Similarly, the level of share price
anticipation of earnings should be stronger when
both types of communication are present than
when only the payment of dividends is present.
Third, if the combination of dividend payments
and voluntary disclosure produces related infor-
mation that is ‘reinforcing’ (i.e. if there is a multi-
plicative effect) then share price anticipation of
earnings will be the greatest for firms that have
high disclosure and also pay dividends.
Finally, if dividend payments and voluntary dis-
closure convey related information, but some of
the information is common to both, i.e. ‘partially
additive’, then the level of share price anticipation
of earnings for firms that have high levels of dis-
closure and pay dividends should be higher than
the level of share price anticipation of earnings
when firms have high levels of disclosure but do
not pay dividends or the level of share price antic-
ipation of earnings should be higher when both
types of communications are present than when
only the payment of dividends is present. We test
to see which of these four possibilities is present in
the data by allowing for an interactive effect in our
model. Thus we state the following hypotheses:
H9 The effects of voluntary disclosure and divi-
dend propensity on the degree of share price
anticipation of earnings are additive.
H10 The effects of voluntary disclosure and divi-
dend propensity on the degree of share price
anticipation of earnings for high-growth
firms are additive.
H11 The effects of voluntary disclosure and divi-
dend propensity on the degree of share price
anticipation of earnings for low-growth firms
are additive.
H12 The strength of the joint effect of disclosure
and dividend propensity on share price antic-
ipation of earnings is the same for high- and
low-growth firms.
To test the above hypotheses, we follow the ap-
proach of Hussainey et al. (2003) to automate the
generation of forward-looking earnings disclosure
scores. Section 3 provides further details. We use
the modified regression model of Collins et al.
(1994) to measure the influence of voluntary dis-
closure and dividend propensity on share price an-
ticipation of earnings. This model is discussed in
Section 4.
3. Disclosure scores
We adopt the scoring methodology developed in
Hussainey et al. (2003). They automate the gener-
ation of disclosure scores for large samples of UK
firms through the use of QSR N6, a text analysis
software package.3 We focus on annual report nar-
ratives because they are more likely to contain vol-
untary forward-looking earnings predictions than
other sections of the annual report. We choose nar-
rative sections with at least one of the following
headings: Financial Highlights, Summary Results,
Chairman’s Statement, Chief Executive Officer’s
Review, Operating and Financial Review, Financial
Review, Financial Director’s Report, Finance
Review, Business Review, and Operating Review.
All other sections of the annual report are exclud-
ed from our analysis (for more details, see
Hussainey et al., 2003).
To measure the informativeness of a firm’s nar-
rative disclosures, we identify the forward-looking
earnings sentences that are most likely to be useful
for predicting a firm’s future earnings changes.
Our measure of disclosure quality is the number of
forward-looking sentences in the annual report
narratives that contain earnings indicators. We
focus on earnings indicators because Hussainey et
al. (2003) and Schleicher et al. (2007) find that
these indicators improve the stock market’s ability
to anticipate future earnings change one year
ahead.
We calculate our disclosure scores in three steps.
The first step requires the identification of all sen-
tences that are associated with forward-looking
statements in annual report narratives. In this step,
we text-search the narrative sections of annual re-
ports using the list of forward-looking key words
adopted in Hussainey et al. (2003: 277). This list
includes the following 35 keywords: accelerate,
anticipate, await, coming (financial) year(s), com-
ing months, confidence (or confident), convince,
(current) financial year, envisage, estimate, even-
tual, expect, forecast, forthcoming, hope, intend
(or intention), likely (or unlikely), look forward (or
look ahead), next, novel, optimistic, outlook,
planned (or planning), predict, prospect, remain,
renew, scope for (or scope to), shall, shortly,
should, soon, will, well placed (or well posi-
tioned), year(s) ahead. Similar to Hussainey et al.
(2003) we also include future year numbers in the
list of forward-looking keywords.
The next step in the generation of earnings dis-
closure scores is the identification of information
items that are relevant to the capital market in as-
sessing the firm’s future earnings. Since the capi-
tal market’s information set is unobservable,
Hussainey et al. (2003) examine the contents of
sell-side analysts’ reports as a proxy for the mar-
ket’s view about the firm’s disclosure quality. For
each forward-looking statement in analysts’ re-
ports, they identify the key noun of that statement.
For the purpose of the current paper, we use the
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 41
3 In the current paper, we use QSR N6 to further facilitate
the automation of text searches. Further information about
QSR N6 is available online at http://www.qsrinternational.com.
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same list adopted in Hussainey et al. (2003: 280)
that is related to earnings indicators. The list con-
tains the following 12 keywords: benefit, break
even, budget, contribution, earnings, EPS, loss,
margin, profit, profitability, return and trading.
Finally, we use QSR N6 to count the number of
sentences that include both at least one forward-
looking keyword and at least one earnings indica-
tor. This is done by finding the intersection of the
keyword search and the topic search.
4. A measure of prices leading earnings
Our measure of prices leading earnings is based on
Collins et al. (1994). They use the future earnings
response coefficient (FERC) as a proxy for the
stock market’s ability to anticipate future earnings.
FERC is estimated by regressing current-year
stock returns on current and future annual earnings
and returns plus control variables. The regression
model of Collins et al. (1994) has been applied in
a large number of recent papers, e.g. Banghøj and
Plenborg, 2008; Dhiensiri et al., 2005; Ettredge et
al., 2005; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Hanlon et al.,
2007; Hussainey et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2007;
Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Orpurt and Zang,
2006; Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; Schleicher et
al., 2007 and Tucker and Zarowin, 2006. In effect
the regression model of Collins et al. (1994) has
become the standard technique for measuring
prices leading earnings.
Collins et al. (1994) start by highlighting the
poor empirical performance of the basic contem-
poraneous returns earnings regression.
Rt = b0 +b1Xt + ut (1)
Where Rt is the stock return for year t. Xt is de-
fined as earnings change deflated by price at t–1.
Under ideal conditions4 equation (1) will yield a
perfect fit, and the earnings response coefficient
(ERC) will be equal to 1 + r–––r   , where r is the required
rate of return on equity (Walker, 2004). Numerous
attempts to estimate equation (1) on annual data
have revealed a very poor statistical fit (an R2 of
10% or less) and an ERC between 1 and 3, i.e.
much lower than the value implied by a typical
cost of equity capital.
Collins et al. (1994) argue that current returns re-
flect information about both current and future
earnings. Therefore any attempt to explain current
stock return in terms of earnings changes, should
control for information about future earnings re-
ceived in the current period. In the light of this ar-
gument, they include three future earnings growth
variables (N=3 and k=1, 2, 3) and make a number
of adjustments to equation (1) to arrive at the fol-
lowing regression model:5
(2)
where:
Rt is the stock return for year t.
Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are the stock returns of years
t+1, t+2 and t+3 respectively.
Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 and Xt+3 are defined as earnings
change deflated by lagged earnings at t–1.
EPt–1 is earnings of period t–1 over price starting
four months after the financial year-end of peri-
od t–1.
AGt is the growth rate of total book value of as-
sets for period t.
Equation (2) shows that a number of forward-
dated variables are introduced in order to measure
the level of prices leading earnings. Specifically,
the model includes future earnings changes as
proxies for the information received by the market
in period t about earnings growth in years t+1 and
beyond. The inclusion of forward returns in the
model, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3, controls for news about
earnings growth in period t+1, t+2 and t+3 re-
ceived in period t+1, t+2 and t+3 respectively.
Because the forward returns variables control for
news received in the future about future earnings,
the forward earnings variables Xt+1, Xt+2 and Xt+3
proxy for news about future earnings received in
the current period, t. This model includes the con-
temporaneous asset growth rate, AGt to control for
the possibility that firms may invest in advance of
future earnings. It also includes the earnings-price
ratio, EPt–1, to control for the possibility that the
earnings of period t–1 are not a good proxy for the
market’s expectations (at time t–1) of the earnings
for period t and beyond.
For the ease of exposition we following the idea
of Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Oswald and
Zarowin (2007) in aggregating future earnings
over three years into one future variable, Xt3 and
future returns over three years into one future vari-
able, Rt3.6 Such aggregations produce the follow-
ing regression model:
Rt = b0 + b1Xt + b2Xt3 + b3Rt3 (3)
+ b4AGt + b5Et–1 + et
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4 Walker (2004) argues that ideal conditions require semi-
strong market efficiency. In such a market, earnings follow a
random walk and earnings at time t capture all value-relevant
information available at time t.
5 Note that Collins et al. (1994) find that the association be-
tween current stock returns and future earnings is not signifi-
cant beyond three years ahead.
6 Lundholm and Myers (2002) show that their results are
unchanged whether the three future years are aggregated or
separated.
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To test our main hypotheses, we use the modi-
fied version of Collins et al. (1994), equation (3).
However, similar to Hussainey et al. (2003) and
Schleicher et al. (2007), in defining the earnings
growth variable, we deflate earnings change by the
share price at the start of the current year and not
by lagged earnings. This is due to the fact that it is
difficult to define earnings growth when lagged
earnings are negative or zero. As a result, a price
deflator is used instead of the earnings deflator.
As argued earlier, current earnings numbers are
likely to be less useful for predicting earnings for
high-growth firms. So we predict that these firms
will use other indicators such as voluntary disclo-
sure or dividend decisions to convey value-rele-
vant information in addition to current earnings.
Such information should enable the market to bet-
ter anticipate a firm’s future earnings. This should
lead to high voluntary disclosure firms or divi-
dend-paying firms having a stronger relationship
between current returns and future earnings
changes than low-disclosure firms or non-divi-
dend-paying firms. Therefore, we predict higher
FERCs for high-disclosure firms or dividend-pay-
ing firms.
To test this prediction we interact all independ-
ent variables in equation (3) with a dummy vari-
able, D, defined to be one for high-disclosure firms
and zero otherwise. We do not use the actual dis-
closure scores. Instead we define D to be 1 for
firms in the top two quartiles of the distribution of
disclosure scores and 0 otherwise.7 We also inter-
act all independent variables with a dummy vari-
able, Div, defined to be one for firms that pay a
dividend in the current year and zero otherwise.
Finally we extend the model to test for the interac-
tion between D and Div. Interacting all explanato-
ry variables in (3) with D, Div, and D*Div yields
our main regression model:
Rt = b0 + b1Xt + b2Xt3 + b3Rt3 + b4AGt + b5EPt–1 (4)
b6D + b7D* Xt + b8D* Xt3 + b9D* Rt3 +
b10D* AGt + b11D* EPt–1
b12Div + b13Div* Xt + b14Div* Xt3 + b15Div* Rt3
+ b16Div* AGt + b17Div* EPt–1
b18D* Div + b19D* Div* Xt + b20D* Div* Xt3
+ b21D* Div* Rt3 + b22D* Div* AGt + b23D* 
Div* EPt–1 + et
The coefficient on Xt is hypothesised to be posi-
tive. The coefficient on Xt3 measures three years
ahead share price anticipation of earnings for non-
dividend-paying firms with low disclosure scores.
This is the base case in the model. All independent
variables are interacted with both of the two
dummy variables D and Div. The coefficient on
D*Xt3 measures the extent to which share price an-
ticipation of earnings is greater for high-disclosure
non-dividend-paying firms compared to the base
case (i.e. it measures the pure disclosure effect).
The coefficient on Div*Xt3 measures the extent to
which share price anticipation of earnings is
greater for low-disclosure dividend-paying firms
compared to the base case.
We expect the regression coefficients associated
with D*Xt3 and Div*Xt3 to be significantly positive
for high-growth firms. In addition we expect these
coefficients to be smaller for low-growth firms
than for high-growth firms.
The variable D*Div*Xt3 measures the incremen-
tal effect of both high disclosure and dividend
propensity. There are four logical possibilities:8
First, both disclosure and dividends provide the
same information. In this case, the coefficient on
D*Xt3 will be equal to the coefficient on Div*Xt3 .
In addition, the coefficient on D*Div*Xt3 should be
negative and equal in absolute value to the coeffi-
cients on D*Xt3 or Div*Xt3 . As a result, the total
impact of both disclosure and dividends should be
calculated as follows:
D*Xt3 + Div*Xt3 + D*Div*Xt3 = D*Xt3
(or = Div*Xt3, since D*Xt3 = Div*Xt3).
Second, both types of communication provide
(‘additive’) unrelated information. In this case, we
predict the coefficient on D*Div*Xt3 should not be
significantly different from zero. As a result, the
total impact of both disclosure and dividends
should be calculated as follows:
D*Xt3 + Div*Xt3 – D*Div*Xt3 = D*Xt3 + Div*Xt3
Third, both types of communication provide 
related information that is ‘reinforcing’ or ‘multi-
plicative’. In this case, the coefficient on
D*Div*Xt3 should be significantly greater than
zero. In other words, the sum of the coefficients on
D*Xt3, Div*Xt3 and D*Div*Xt3 should be signifi-
cantly greater than the sum of the coefficients on
D*Xt3 and Div*Xt3. In this case, the inference is
that both dividend propensity and voluntary dis-
closure are strictly complementary.
Finally, both types of communication provide
related information, but some of the information 
is common to both, i.e. ‘partially additive’.
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7 In Hussainey et al. (2003) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002),
the authors drop observations with disclosure scores in the
second and third quartiles. However, we use the full sample
without dropping observations in the middle quartiles to main-
tain a usable sample size for the regression analyses. As we
will discuss later, Table 1, Panel C shows that the number of
usable non-dividend-paying firms is 551. This number com-
prises 297 high-growth firm-years and 254 low-growth firm-
years. Deleting firms in the middle quartiles will significantly
reduce the usable number of observations in each growth cat-
egory (e.g. the number will be 142 for high-growth firms and
111 for low-growth firms).
8 The authors thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.
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Therefore, we predict that the coefficient on
D*Div*Xt3 should be significantly lesser than zero.
In other words, the sum of the coefficients on
D*Xt3, Div*Xt3 and D*Div*Xt3 should be signifi-
cantly less than the sum of the coefficients on
D*Xt3 and Div*Xt3. In this case, the inference is
that both dividend propensity and voluntary dis-
closure are partial substitutes.
We treat the issue of which of these four logical
possibilities is true as a purely empirical question
and offer no prior theoretical predictions as to
which of these outcomes is the most likely.
5. Data
To perform our analyses, annual reports in an elec-
tronic format are required in order to use QSR N6
software as a text analysis tool. Therefore, our ini-
tial sample is limited to all UK non-financial firms
on the Dialog database that have at least one an-
nual report. Dialog covers large cross-sections of
electronic non-financial UK annual reports for the
years 1996–2002. So, we limit our study to that
sample period.9 We use book-to-market value as a
measure of growth. We measure growth on a year-
ly basis. This allows us to examine the effect of
disclosure and dividends on share price anticipa-
tion of earnings when firms are classified as high-
growth or low-growth in a particular time period.
We identify high-growth firms as those having
below median levels of book-to-market value and
low-growth firms as those having above median
levels of book-to-market value.
The total number of annual reports on Dialog for
non-financial firms for the sample period is 8,098.
Of those, 7,977 firm-years have matching records
in Datastream. We delete 1,312 firm-years obser-
vations because of changing year-ends. This leaves
6,665 firm-years. We also delete 2,958 firm-years
missing observations. This leaves 3,707 firm-year
observations. Finally, we delete outliers defined as
observations falling into the top or bottom 1% of
the distribution of any of the regression variables.
Following Schleicher et al. (2007), we treat the ob-
servations of high- and low-growth firms as sepa-
rate distributions. Otherwise, an unreasonably large
number of high-growth firms’ observations will fall
into the top and bottom 1%. Deletion of inappro-
priate observations and observations with missing
data reduces the sample to 3,503 firm-years obser-
vations. Of those, 1,770 firm-years are high-growth
firms and 1,733 firm-years are low-growth firms.
Earnings per share data is calculated by dividing
operating income before all exceptional items
(Worldscope item 01250) by the outstanding num-
ber of shares. Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2 and Xt+3 are then defined
as the earnings change for the periods t, t+1, t+2
and t+3 deflated by the share price. Both current
and future earnings changes are deflated by the
share price at the start of the return window for pe-
riod t. Xt3 is calculated as the aggregated future
earnings over the following three years relative to
the financial year-end. We collect returns data from
Datastream. Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 and Rt+3 are measured as
buy-and-hold returns starting from eight months
before the financial year-end to four months after
the financial year-end in year t. In the return meas-
ures, similar to Hussainey et al. (2003), we incor-
porate a four-month lag to ensure that annual
reports have been released. Rt3 is calculated as the
aggregated future returns over the following three
years relative to the financial year-end. Earnings
yield, EPt–1, is defined as period t–1’s earnings over
price four months after the financial year-end of pe-
riod t–1. AGt is the growth rate of total book value
of assets for period t (Datastream item 392).
We collect dividends per share from Worldscope
(item 05101).10 The dividends dummy variable,
Div, is set equal to one if firms pay dividends in
year t and zero otherwise. In addition to the above
variables, we use a disclosure dummy variable to
examine the effect of disclosure on the returns-
earnings association. The disclosure dummy, D, is
set equal to one for firms in the top two quartiles
of the distributions of disclosure scores and zero
otherwise. As mentioned earlier, we identify high-
(low-) growth firms as those having below (above)
median levels of BTMV. BTMV ratio is calculated
as the inverse of the market to book value of equi-
ty ratio (Datastream item: MTBV).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our re-
gression variables. Panel A reports the descriptive
analysis for the full sample. Panel B (C) reports
the descriptive analysis for dividend (non-divi-
dend) paying firms. Panel D (E) reports the de-
scriptive analysis for high- (low-) growth firms.
Table 1 shows that dividends were paid in 84%
(=2952/3503) of the firm years in our sample.11
44 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 Dividends are usually tested over longer sample periods.
However, we restrict our analyses to the years in which large
numbers of annual reports are available on Dialog. This en-
ables us to test the joint effect of disclosure and dividends on
prices leading earnings.
10 Worldscope defines dividends per share (item 05101) as
‘the total dividends per share declared during the calendar
year for U.S. corporations and fiscal year for Non-US corpo-
rations. It includes extra dividends declared during the year.
Dividends per share are based on the ‘gross’ dividend of a se-
curity, before normal withholding tax is deducted at a coun-
try’s basic rate, but excluding the special tax credit available
in some countries’.
11 The proportion of dividend-paying firms for the overall
population of UK firms is 69%. This number is calculated by
dividing the total number of dividend-paying firms by the total
number of firms in the period of 1996–2002. This number is
consistent with a recent study by Denis and Osobov (2008)
which find that 73% of UK firms pay dividends in the sample
period 1996–2002. However, in our sample, the proportion of
dividend-paying firms is much higher than the overall popula-
tion of dividend-paying firms. This is due to the deletion of in-
appropriate observations and observations with missing data
in the sample period of 1996–2002.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median OBS
Panel A: Full sample
Rt 0.089 0.038 3503
Xt 0.007 0.008 3503
Xt3 0.006 0.005 3503
Rt3 0.295 0.222 3503
AGt 0.173 0.078 3503
EPt–1 0.091 0.093 3503
Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 1674
Disclosure = High 7.2 6 1829
Panel B: Dividend-paying firms
Rt 0.116 0.065 2952
Xt 0.006 0.008 2952
Xt3 –0.002 0.003 2952
Rt3 0.301 0.237 2952
AGt 0.171 0.085 2952
EPt–1 0.119 0.102 2952
Disclosure = Low 1.8 2 1297
Disclosure = High 7.4 6 1655
Panel C: Non-dividend-paying firms
Rt –0.055 –0.187 551
Xt 0.017 0.001 551
Xt3 0.050 0.024 551
Rt3 0.267 0.082 551
AGt 0.184 0.015 551
EPt–1 –0.058 –0.020 551
Disclosure = Low 1.4 1 377
Disclosure = High 6.1 5 174
Panel D: High-growth firms
Rt 0.089 0.033 1770
Xt 0.007 0.008 1770
Xt3 0.002 0.003 1770
Rt3 0.234 0.166 1770
AGt 0.220 0.114 1770
EPt–1 0.073 0.079 1770
Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 828
Disclosure = High 7.3 6 942
Panel E: Low-growth firms
Rt 0.089 0.043 1733
Xt 0.008 0.007 1733
Xt3 0.010 0.007 1733
Rt3 0.358 0.284 1733
AGt 0.124 0.050 1733
EPt–1 0.110 0.116 1733
Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 846
Disclosure = High 7.1 6 887
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:19
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
46 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (continued)
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive analysis for the full sample. Panel B (C)
reports the descriptive analysis for dividend (non-dividend) paying firms. Panel D (E) reports the descriptive
analysis for high- (low-) growth firms. Returns, Rt, is calculated as buy-and-hold returns from eight months be-
fore the financial year-end to four months after the financial year-end. Rt3 is the aggregated three years future
returns. The earnings variable, Xt, is defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price four
months after the end of the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. Earnings
measure is the Worldscope item 01250 which is operating income before all exceptional items. EPt–1 is defined
as period t–1’s earnings over price four months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the growth rate
of total book value of assets for period t (Datastream item 392). Firm-years with a disclosure score on top (bot-
tom) 50% of the distribution of disclosure scores are defined as high- (low-) disclosure firm-year. Dividend
(non-dividend) paying firms are those paying (not paying) dividends at the current year. Dividends measure is
dividends per share, Worldscope item 05101. High-growth firms are defined as those having below median lev-
els of BTMV, while low-growth firms are defined as those having above median levels of BTMV. BTMV ratio
is calculated as the inverse of the market-to-book value of equity ratio (Datastream item MTBV).
Panels B and C of Table 1 show that the median re-
turn in period t is positive for dividend-paying
firms, whilst it is negative for non-dividend-pay-
ing firms. The median current and future earnings
change is positive for both dividend-paying and
non-dividend-paying firms.
Panels B and C of Table 1 also show that divi-
dend-paying firms, on average, have slightly
higher mean and median levels of voluntary dis-
closure than non-dividend-paying firms. 56% of
dividend-paying firms are in the category of high-
disclosure firms compared to 32% of non-divi-
dend-paying firms.12 The table shows a material
difference in the disclosure scores between firms
in high- and low-disclosure categories for both
dividend and non-dividend-paying firms. The
mean disclosure score ranges from 6.1 to 7.4 for-
ward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the
high-disclosure category; whilst the mean disclo-
sure score ranges from 1.4 to 1.8 forward-looking
earnings sentences for firms in the low-disclosure
category. The differences in means between high-
and low-disclosure scores are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level (not reported in Table 1).
Panels D and E of Table 1 show that the median
disclosure scores for the high- and low-disclosure
groups is quite similar across high- and low-
growth firms. The median disclosure score is six
forward-looking earnings sentences for firms in
the high-disclosure category; whilst it is two for-
ward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the
low-disclosure category. In addition, the differ-
ences in means between high- and low-disclosure
scores are statistically significant at the 1% level
(not reported in Table 1). Panels D and E also
show that the median return in period t for high-
growth firms (3.3%) is slightly lower than that for
low-growth firms (4.3%). The median current and
future earnings change is positive for both high-
and low-growth firms. Finally, the median future
earnings changes of low-growth firms are higher
than those of high-growth firms.
6. Main empirical results
Our main empirical results are based on pooled re-
gressions for the sample period 1996–2002.13
Table 2 reports these results. Column 2 reports the
results for the full sample. Column 3 (4) reports
the results for firms in the high- (low-) growth
firms. Heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values are
given in parentheses.
6.1. Disclosure and prices leading earnings
Table 2, column 2 presents the results of esti-
mating equation (4) for the full sample. As expect-
ed, the coefficient associated with Xt is positive
and significant. The coefficient for Xt is 0.80 with
a p-value of 0.001. However, the coefficient for Xt3
is –0.06 with a p-value of 0.767. This suggests that
current stock price is positively associated with
current earnings changes, but not with future earn-
ings change. So there is no evidence that prices
lead earnings for low-disclosure firms that pay no
dividends.
The incremental predictive value of high for-
ward-looking earnings disclosures for anticipat-
ing future earnings is given by the coefficient on
12 The percentages are calculated as 56% = 1655/2952 and
32% = 174/551.
13 Hanlon et al. (2007: 16) argue that ‘future earnings re-
sponse regressions are likely to suffer from both cross-sec-
tional correlation (correlation across firms within a year) and
time series correlation (over time within the same firm)’. We
follow the method recommended by Petersen (2008) and used
in Hanlon et al. (2007) by including year dummies to control
for the time series correlation and by allowing for error clus-
tering within firms (Rogers standard errors) to control for the
cross-sectional correlation.
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Table 2
Regression results: the effect of disclosure and dividend propensity on prices leading earnings
Independent variable Full sample High-growth firms Low-growth firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.01 0.04 –0.03
(0.710) (0.405) (0.464)
Xt 0.80*** 0.42 1.12***
(0.001) (0.356) (0.001)
Xt3 –0.06 –0.63** 0.44***
(0.767) (0.031) (0.005)
Rt3 –0.10*** –0.12*** –0.12***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGt 0.07 0.06 0.09
(0.158) (0.325) (0.353)
EPt–1 0.49*** 0.12 0.83***
(0.009) (0.737) (0.001)
D –0.09* –0.18** –0.01
(0.086) (0.011) (0.874)
D*Xt 0.62* 1.78*** 0.21
(0.066) (0.005) (0.623)
D*Xt3 0.68** 1.63** 0.19
(0.031) (0.036) (0.467)
D*Rt3 0.06 0.10 0.04
(0.175) (0.116) (0.494)
D*AGt 0.06 0.11 0.05
(0.483) (0.382) (0.722)
D*EPt–1 0.19 0.69 0.16
(0.488) (0.166) (0.508)
Div 0.05 0.07 0.06
(0.241) (0.259) (0.203)
Div*Xt 0.92*** 2.01** 0.48
(0.009) (0.012) (0.194)
Div*Xt3 0.51** 1.62*** –0.13
(0.025) (0.001) (0.502)
Div*Rt3 0.06* 0.07 0.09*
(0.066) (0.171) (0.058)
Div*AGt 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.296) (0.455) (0.562)
Div*EPt–1 0.21 0.34 –0.04
(0.389) (0.480) (0.886)
D*Div 0.10 0.13 0.04
(0.127) (0.136) (0.674)
D*Div*Xt –0.50 –2.19** –0.03
(0.290) (0.039) (0.961)
D*Div*Xt3 –0.44 –1.68* 0.07
(0.220) (0.064) (0.845)
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D*Xt3. The coefficient on D*Xt3 is 0.68 with a 
p-value of 0.031. The significantly positive coef-
ficient suggests that high-disclosure firms that
pay no dividends exhibit higher levels of share
price anticipation of earnings three years ahead
than low-disclosure firms that pay no dividends.
Thus the effect of disclosure on prices leading
earnings is in line with the prior findings of
Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and
Zarowin (2002). Based on these findings, we ac-
cept hypothesis 1.
Table 2, columns 3 and 4 reveal a number of sig-
nificant differences between high- and low-growth
firms. The current earnings variable exhibits a
higher ERC for low-growth firms than high-
growth firms. The coefficient on Xt is 1.12 with a
p-value of 0.001 for low-growth firms, while it is
positive (0.42), but insignificant, for high-growth
firms. The difference between the two coefficients
is statistically significant at the 1% level.
We find no evidence of share price anticipation
of earnings for high-growth firms that pay no div-
idends and that provide low voluntary disclosure.
For these firms, we obtain a statistically significant
negative coefficient on Xt3. This indicates that the
market is unable to anticipate future earnings
changes for high-growth firms that provide low
voluntary disclosure in their annual report discus-
sion sections and that do not pay dividends in the
current year. In contrast there is strong evidence
that low-growth low-disclosure firms that do not
pay dividends do exhibit share price anticipation
of earnings for three years ahead. The coefficient
on Xt3 is positive and significant at the 1% level.
Looking at the effect of disclosure on prices
leading earnings, we find that the coefficient on
D*Xt3 for high-growth firms is 1.63 with a p-value
of 0.036. This coefficient indicates that narrative
forward-looking earnings disclosures in high-
growth firms’ annual reports improve the market’s
ability to anticipate future earnings change three
years ahead. Based on this result we accept hy-
pothesis 2.
In contrast, there appears to be no significant ef-
fect of disclosure on share price anticipation of
earnings for low-growth firms that do not pay div-
idends. The coefficient on D*Xt3, for high-disclo-
sure low-growth firms is 0.19 with a p-value of
0.467. Thus, the voluntary disclosures of low-
growth firms do not appear to improve the stock
market’s ability to anticipate future earnings
changes. This leads us to reject hypothesis 3.
48 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 2
Regression results: the effect of disclosure and dividend propensity on prices leading earnings (continued)
Independent variable Full sample High-growth firms Low-growth firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D*Div*Rt3 –0.05 –0.08 –0.03
(0.357) (0.293) (0.664)
D*Div*AGt –0.11 –0.10 –0.13
(0.288) (0.461) (0.397)
D*Div*EPt–1 –0.48 –0.66 –0.56*
(0.158) (0.316) (0.098)
Observations 3,503 1,770 1,733
R2 0.157 0.176 0.183
Table 2 reports regression results. The results for firms in high- and low-growth firms are reported in columns
(3) and (4), respectively. The ‘Full Sample’ results in column (2) combine both types of firms in a single panel.
P-values are reported in parentheses. Returns, Rt, is calculated as buy-and-hold returns from eight months be-
fore the financial year-end to four months after the financial year-end. Rt3 is the aggregated three years’ future
returns. The earnings variable, Xt,  is defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price four
months after the end of the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years’ future earnings change.
Earnings measure is the Worldscope item 01250 which is operating income before all exceptional items. EPt–1
is defined as period t–1’s earnings over price four months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AGt is the
growth rate of total book value of assets for period t (Datastream item 392). Firms with a disclosure score in
the top (bottom) 50% of the distribution of disclosure scores are defined as high- (low-) disclosure firms. The
dummy variable, D, is set equal to 1 (0) for high- (low-) disclosure firms. Dividends measure is dividends per
share, Worldscope item 05101. The dummy variable, Div, is set equal to 1 (0) for firms paying (not paying)
dividends at the current year. High-growth firms are defined as those having below median levels of BTMV,
while low-growth firms are defined as those having above median levels of BTMV. BTMV ratio is calculated
as the inverse of the market-to-book value of equity ratio (Datastream item MTBV). The significance levels
(two-tail test) are: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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Overall our evidence for low-growth firms sug-
gests that the market is able to forecast future earn-
ings changes, but this ability is neither linked to
nor improved by forward-looking earnings state-
ments in annual report narrative sections. The evi-
dence for high-growth firms supports the view that
the market has particular difficulties in forecasting
firms’ future earnings changes. However, this dif-
ficulty is partially overcome by increasing the
number of forward-looking earnings information
in annual report narrative sections.
We also test for differences between high-
growth firms and low-growth firms. We test the
extent to which the association between share
price anticipation of earnings and disclosure is sig-
nificantly stronger for high-growth firms than for
low-growth firms. We perform this test by includ-
ing all high- and low-growth firms in one dataset.
Then, before running our analyses, we create a
dummy variable to equal 1 for high-growth firms
and zero otherwise. Finally, we interact the high-
growth dummy variable throughout the model. We
find a positive and significant coefficient on
Growth*D*Xt3 of 0.50 with a p-value of 0.020 (not
reported in Table 2). This suggests that that the
strength of the degree of association between share
price anticipation of earnings and voluntary dis-
closure is stronger for high-growth firms than for
low-growth firms. This leads us to accept hypoth-
esis 4.
6.2. Dividends and prices leading earnings
As discussed earlier, voluntary disclosure is one
of the ways that firms provide information about
future earnings to the market. Another way that
firms can provide information is through dividend
policy. Here we examine the extent to which divi-
dend propensity improves the stock market’s abil-
ity to anticipate future earnings changes. The
incremental predictive effect of dividend propensi-
ty on share price anticipation of earnings is given
by the coefficient on Div*Xt3.
Column 2, Table 2 shows that the coefficient on
Div*Xt3 is positive and significant. This coefficient
is 0.51 with a p-value of 0.025. This indicates that
paying dividends improves the market’s ability to
anticipate future earning changes. The significant
positive coefficient indicates that low-disclosure
firms that pay dividends exhibit higher levels of
share price anticipation of earnings than low-dis-
closure firms that pay no dividends. The signifi-
cant effect of dividend propensity on prices
leading earnings is in line with the findings of
Hanlon et al. (2007). Based on these findings, we
accept hypothesis 5.
Table 2, column 3 shows that the coefficient on
Div*Xt3 for high-growth firms is 1.62 with a p-
value of 0.001. This coefficient demonstrates that
high-growth dividend-paying firms exhibit signif-
icantly higher levels of share price anticipation of
earnings than high-growth non-dividend-paying
firms. Based on this result we accept hypothesis 6.
In contrast, Table 2, column 4 shows that the co-
efficient on Div*Xt3 for low-growth firms is nega-
tive and insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence
that the dividend propensity of low-growth firms is
associated with an improvement in the market’s
ability to anticipate future earnings changes. Based
on this result we reject hypothesis 7.
Overall our evidence indicates that there is a ma-
terial difference between high- and low-growth
firms in the association between dividend propen-
sity and share price anticipation of earnings. For
high-growth firms we find that the ability of the
market to anticipate future earnings changes is sig-
nificantly greater when the firm pays dividends in
the current year. We find no such evidence for low-
growth firms.
We test for a difference between high-growth
and low-growth firms by interacting a dummy
variable for high growth throughout the model. We
find a positive and significant coefficient on
Growth*Div*Xt3 of 1.41 with a p-value of 0.001(not reported in Table 2). This suggests that the
strength of the degree of association between share
price anticipation of earnings and dividend
propensity is stronger for high-growth firms than
for low-growth firms. This leads us to accept hy-
pothesis 8.
Summarising the results for the above hypothe-
ses (H1–H8), we find that both dividend propensi-
ty and high disclosure are positively associated
with share price anticipation of earnings for high-
growth firms. However, there is no evidence of
similar effects for low-growth firms.
6.3. The joint effect of disclosure and dividends
on prices leading earnings
We now turn to the hypotheses which are con-
cerned with the joint effects of high disclosure
and dividend propensity on prices leading earn-
ings. The incremental predictive value of both
high disclosure and dividend propensity for an-
ticipating future earnings is given by the coeffi-
cient on D*Div*Xt3. Column 2, Table 2 shows
some evidence of a substitution effect. The coef-
ficient on the interaction variable D*Div*Xt3 is
negative (–0.44) and statistically insignificant at
an accepted level. This indicates that both disclo-
sure and dividends provide related information,
but some of the information is common to both,
i.e. the effects are ‘partially additive’. Our best
estimate for the combined effect of disclosure
and dividend is 0.75 (i.e. 0.68 + 0.51– 0.44]
which is smaller than the sum of the coefficients
on D*Xt3 and Div*Xt3 [1.19 = 0.68 + 0.51] with a
p-value of 0.001 (not reported in Table 2).
However, because of the insignificant coefficient
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50 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
on D*Div*Xt3, it is not safe to assume that the
combined effect of disclosure and dividends is
additive. Therefore, we reject hypothesis 9.
For high-growth firms, we also find some evi-
dence of a substitution effect. The coefficient on
the interaction variable D*Div*Xt3 is negative(–1.68) and significantly significant at the 10%
level. This indicates that disclosure and dividends
provide related information, but some of the infor-
mation is common to both. Thus, it is not safe to
assume that the combined effect of high disclosure
and dividend propensity is perfectly additive. Our
best estimate is that the combined effect of divi-
dend propensity and high disclosure is 1.57 (i.e.
1.63 + 1.62 – 1.68) with a p-value of 0.001 (not re-
ported in Table 2), which is below the first order
effect for high disclosure and below the first order
effect of dividend propensity. In this case, the in-
ference is that both dividend propensity and vol-
untary disclosure are strict substitutes for
high-growth firms. Based on these findings we re-
ject hypothesis 10.
As the results for the low-growth firms indicate
that there is no first order effects either for divi-
dend propensity or voluntary disclosure, we find
that the coefficient on D*Div*Xt3 is positive (close
to zero) and statistically insignificant at an accept-
ed level. Based on these findings we reject hy-
pothesis 11.
Finally, we test for differences between high-
growth and low-growth firms by including an ad-
ditional dummy variable for high-growth firms.
We test the extent to which the association be-
tween the joint effect of voluntary disclosure and
the payments of dividends on prices leading earn-
ings are significantly stronger for high-growth
firms than for low-growth firms. The analysis
shows a negative significant coefficient on
Growth*D*Div*Xt3 of –1.83 with a p-value of
0.067 (not reported in Table 2). This significantly
negative coefficient indicates that dividend
propensity and high voluntary disclosure are strict
substitutes for high-growth firms. We do not find
such evidence for low-growth firms. This leads us
to reject hypothesis 12.
7. Robustness analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our re-
sults to the determinants of the earnings response
coefficients. Lundholm and Myers (2002) examine
a number of determinants of current earnings re-
sponse coefficient when exploring the association
between share price anticipation of earnings and
corporate disclosure. These determinants include
loss status, growth, beta, earnings persistence, size
and the sign of the current return. Hanlon et al.
(2007) examine a similar set of determinants when
exploring the association between share price an-
ticipation of earnings and dividend propensity. The
results of both studies (after the inclusion of con-
trol variables) remain consistent with the original
findings indicating that these control variables do
not drive the association between disclosure (and
dividends) and share price anticipation of earn-
ings.
Schleicher et al. (2007) provide evidence that the
association between annual report narratives and
share price anticipation of earnings is not the same
for profitable and unprofitable firms. They find
that the ability of stock returns to anticipate the
next year’s earnings change is significantly
stronger for high-disclosure unprofitable firms.
They do not find the same result for profitable
firms. Therefore, based on the results in Schleicher
et al. (2007), we examine the sensitivity of our 
results to firm profitability status. Similar to
Schleicher et al. (2007) we define a loss (profit) as
negative (positive) operating income before all
(operating and non-operating) exceptional items
(Worldscope item 01250).
To examine the effect of losses on the association
between disclosure, dividends and prices leading
earnings, we divide our sample into two categories;
unprofitable firms and profitable firms. Then, we
run our regression model (equation 4) for each cat-
egory. The results are reported in Table 3.
Consistent with Schleicher et al. (2007),
columns 2.1 and 3.1 of Table 3 show that high dis-
closure increases the market’s ability to anticipate
future earnings changes for unprofitable firms –
but not for profitable firms. The coefficient on
D*Xt3 is positive (1.01) and statistically significant
at the 5% level for unprofitable firms, whilst it is
smaller and insignificant for profitable firms.
Table 3 shows that several of our previous find-
ings still hold after separating our sample into un-
profitable firms and profitable firms. In particular,
column 3.3 shows that the market is able to antic-
ipate future earnings changes for low-growth prof-
itable firms (the coefficient on Xt3 is significantly
positive at the 5% level). This ability is neither
linked to nor improved by high disclosure or divi-
dend propensity. In addition, columns 2.2 and 3.2
show that the market has particular difficulties in
anticipating future earnings changes for high-
growth profitable and unprofitable firms. The co-
efficient on Xt3 for these firms is negative.
Consistent with results in Table 2, we find that
the effect of high disclosure on prices leading
earnings is positive for high-growth firms regard-
less of their profitability status. The coefficient on
DXt3 is 0.93 with a p-value of 0.209 for high-
growth unprofitable firms and 1.47 with a p-value
of 0.160 for high-growth profitable firms. Table 3
also shows that the effect of disclosure on prices
leading earnings for high-growth firms is greater
than the effect for low-growth firms regardless 
of the profitability of the firms. In particular, the
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:19
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 51
Table 3
Robustness analysis: comparing unprofitable with profitable firms
Independent Unprofitable Profitable 
variable (1) firms (2) firms (3)
Full High-growth Low-growth Full High-growth Low-growth 
sample firms firms sample firms firms 
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3)
Intercept –0.14* –0.01 –0.26*** 0.08 0.06 0.05
(0.087) (0.957) (0.001) (0.285) (0.556) (0.617)
Xt –0.28 –0.90 0.21 1.13*** 1.50** 1.36**
(0.343) (0.122) (0.470) (0.009) (0.029) (0.014)
Xt3 –0.56** –1.12** 0.10 0.18 –0.28 0.68**
(0.025) (0.019) (0.645) (0.585) (0.451) (0.015)
Rt3 –0.09*** –0.12** –0.07* –0.10** –0.06 –0.19***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.051) (0.028) (0.316) (0.001)
AGt 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.03
(0.141) (0.522) (0.207) (0.440) (0.280) (0.885)
EPt–1 –0.30 –0.88 0.18 0.51 0.35 0.89*
(0.269) (0.108) (0.468) (0.217) (0.657) (0.064)
D –0.13 –0.16* 0.02 –0.14 –0.19 0.07
(0.048) (0.098) (0.864) (0.177) (0.224) (0.654)
D*Xt 0.69 2.24** 0.29 0.74 0.24 0.60
(0.125) (0.030) (0.512) (0.270) (0.802) (0.481)
D*Xt3 1.01** 0.93 0.59 0.58 1.47 –0.08
(0.011) (0.209) (0.101) (0.184) (0.160) (0.809)
D*Rt3 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.02 –0.02
(0.109) (0.242) (0.178) (0.965) (0.849) (0.873)
D*AGt 0.02 0.03 –0.03 0.28 0.23 0.33
(0.854) (0.763) (0.808) (0.118) (0.358) (0.232)
D*EPt–1 0.29 0.66 0.60 0.38 0.98 –0.42
(0.488) (0.325) (0.134) (0.429) 0.3029 (0.421)
Div 0.06 –0.04 0.18* –0.04 –0.01 –0.04
(0.494) (0.804) (0.084) (0.580) (0.978) (0.706)
Div*Xt 0.85* 1.03 1.05** 0.90* 2.15 0.43
(0.075) (0.275) (0.036) (0.098) (0.023) (0.511)
Div*Xt3 0.53 1.08 0.08 0.32 1.51 –0.37
(0.248) (0.390) (0.883) (0.370) (0.004) (0.219)
Div*Rt3 0.24** 0.33** 0.20** 0.04 –0.02 0.14**
(0.016) (0.044) (0.039) (0.402) (0.775) (0.029)
Div*AGt –0.01 –0.19 0.40 0.07 0.01 0.11
(0.974) (0.692) (0.149) (0.510) (0.935) (0.604)
Div*EPt–1 0.19 –0.13 0.79 0.38 0.55 0.03
(0.674) (0.894) (0.229) (0.395) (0.528) (0.958)
D*Div 0.05 0.23 –0.25* 0.17 0.19 –0.01
(0.661) (0.357) (0.088) (0.118) (0.250) (0.930)
D*Div*Xt –2.02* –1.81 –3.91*** –0.90 –1.90 –0.55
(0.098) (0.583) (0.001) (0.254) (0.136) (0.566)
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Table 3
Robustness analysis: comparing unprofitable with profitable firms (continued)
Independent Unprofitable Profitable 
variable (1) firms (2) firms (3)
Full High-growth Low-growth Full High-growth Low-growth 
sample firms firms sample firms firms 
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3)
D*Div*Xt3 –0.23 1.68 –1.00 –0.40 –1.79 0.36
(0.749) (0.332) (0.184) (0.404) (0.113) (0.384)
D*Div*Rt3 –0.23* –0.40** –0.26** 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.052) (0.037) (0.023) (0.765) (0.761) (0.794)
D*Div*AGt 0.47 0.86 –0.41 –0.34* –0.23 –0.42
(0.251) (0.173) (0.227) (0.068) (0.367) (0.144)
D*Div*EPt–1 –2.15* –1.96 –4.66*** –0.88 –1.42 –0.14
(0.072) (0.592) (0.001) (0.096) (0.186) (0.814)
Observations 439 232 207 3,064 1,538 1,526
R2 0.170 0.304 0.164 0.143 0.162 0.174
Table 3 reports robustness results. The results for unprofitable and profitable firms are reported in columns (2)
and (3), respectively. In each category, we report the results for the full sample, high-growth firms and low-
growth firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. Returns, Rt, is calculated as buy-and-hold returns from eight
months before the financial year-end to four months after the financial year-end. Rt3 is the aggregated three
years’ future returns. The earnings variable, Xt, is defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share
price four months after the end of the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years’ future earnings
change. Earnings measure is the Worldscope item 01250 which is operating income before all exceptional
items. EPt–1 is defined as period t–1’s earnings over price four months after the financial year-end of period
t–1. AGt is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t (Datastream item 392). Firms with a dis-
closure score in the top (bottom) 50% of the distribution of disclosure scores are defined as high- (low-) dis-
closure firms. The dummy variable, D, is set equal to 1 (0) for high- (low-) disclosure firms. Dividends measure
is dividends per share, Worldscope item 05101. The dummy variable, Div, is set equal to 1 (0) for firms pay-
ing (not paying) dividends at the current year. High-growth firms are defined as those having below median
levels of BTMV, while low-growth firms are defined as those having above median levels of BTMV. BTMV
ratio is calculated as the inverse of the market-to-book value of equity ratio (Datastream item MTBV). The sig-
nificance levels (two-tail test) are: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
coefficient on DXt3 is higher for high-growth un-
profitable firms than for low-growth unprofitable
firms. However, the difference between high-
growth unprofitable firms and low-growth unprof-
itable firms is not statistically significant (not
reported in Table 3).14 On the other hand, the effect
of disclosure on prices leading earnings for high-
growth profitable firms is significantly greater
than the effect for low-growth profitable firms
(significant at the 10% level; not reported in Table
3). The results suggest that the strength of the de-
gree of association between share price anticipa-
tion of earnings and voluntary disclosure is greater
for high-growth firms than for low-growth firms.
Consistent with results in Table 2, we find that
the effect of dividend propensity on prices leading
earnings is positive for high-growth firms, while it
is negative or close to zero for low-growth firms.
However, the effect for high-growth firms is only
statistically significant for high-growth profitable
firms at the 1% level.
The effect of dividend propensity on prices lead-
ing earnings is significantly greater for high-
growth firms than for low-growth firms, in both
profitability subsamples. For unprofitable firms
the coefficient on Div*Xt3 is 1.08 with a p-value of
0.390 for high-growth unprofitable firms, while it
is 0.08 with a p-value of 0.883 for low-growth un-
profitable firms. The difference between high and 
low-growth unprofitable firms is statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level (not reported in Table 3).
For profitable firms the coefficient on Div*Xt3 is
14 As mentioned earlier, we statistically test the actual differ-
ences between high- and low-growth firms by interacting a
dummy variable for high growth throughout Equation (4).
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1.51 and significant at the 1% level for high-
growth firms, while it is negative and insignificant
for low-growth firms. The difference between high
and low-growth profitable firms is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level (not reported in Table 3).
These results confirm that the strength of the de-
gree of association between share price anticipa-
tion of earnings and dividend propensity is greater
for high-growth firms than for low-growth firms.
A particularly interesting feature of Table 3 is the
way that the joint effect of dividend propensity and
disclosure varies between profitable and unprof-
itable firms. In particular the results suggest some
(weak) evidence of a complementary effect for
high-growth unprofitable firms. The subsitution
effect that we reported in Table 2 is confirmed in
the high-growth profitable subsample, although it
is no longer statistically significant. The difference
between high-growth unprofitable and high-
growth profitable firms for the coefficient on
D*Div*Xt3 is significant at the 1% level (not re-
ported in Table 3).
Finally, it is worth noting that for high-growth
unprofitable firms the combined effects of high
disclosure and dividend propensity are very con-
siderable (0.93 + 1.08 + 1.68 = 3.69). High-growth
unprofitable firms are the firms for which current
earnings is least relevant (revealed by a negative
current earnings response coefficient (ERC)), and
for which the combined effects of narrative disclo-
sure and dividend propensity are the most useful
for predicting future earnings.
8. Conclusion
This paper builds on literature that examines the
link between narrative disclosures and prices lead-
ing earnings.
We extend this work in two important ways.
First, it is well known that financial policy choic-
es, such as dividend signalling, potentially offer an
alternative set of devices for conveying value-rel-
evant information to the market. In particular firms
that pay dividends may use changes in dividends
to signal future profitability. We investigate
whether firms that pay dividends exhibit higher
levels of share price anticipation of earnings, and
whether dividend propensity acts as a substitute
for narrative disclosure in financial communica-
tion.
Second, we investigate whether firm growth
characteristics affect the extent to which prices
lead earnings, and whether the importance of divi-
dend signalling and narrative disclosures varies
between high- and low-growth firms.
Our results show a number of significant differ-
ences between high- and low-growth firms. We
find that high-growth, low-disclosure firms that
pay no dividends exhibit no share price anticipa-
tion of earnings. On the other hand, we find that
low-growth, low-disclosure firms that pay no div-
idends exhibit significant share price anticipation
of earnings. We also find that dividend propensity
and high voluntary disclosure improve the mar-
ket’s ability to anticipate future earnings changes
for high-growth firms, but not for low-growth
firms.
With regard to the additvity or otherwise of dis-
closure and dividend propensity we find, for the
high-growth firm subsample for which both of the
individual effects are significant, that the effects of
voluntary disclosure and dividend propensity on
the degree of share price anticipation of earnings
are not perfectly additive.
This paper is the first to study effect of firm-spe-
cific growth characteristics on the association be-
tween voluntary disclosure, dividend propensity
and prices leading earnings. Whilst we focus only
on the growth characteristics of firms it would also
be interesting to examine the effect of other firms’
characteristics such as risk.
Another interesting issue for future work would
be to consider the factors that determine the choice
between dividend signalling and increased disclo-
sure as alternative forms of financial communica-
tion for high-growth firms. For example, is it the
case that firms with potentially high third party
disclosure costs are more likely to use dividend
signalling?
Finally, it is worth noting that the dividend
propensity of UK firms has recently declined
(Vieira and Raposo, 2007), although this has to
some extent been offset by an increase in share re-
purchases. Future work could test for a change in
the dividend propensity effect following an overall
decline in dividend propensity, and it could also
test to see if share repurchases are associated with
greater share price anticipation of earnings.
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